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Introduction. 
The recent efflorescence of interest in “endogenous” theories of economic growth has 
focused attention on the nature and role of knowledge in the growth process (Romer 
1986, 1990; Grossman and Helpman 1990, 1994).  Unlike earlier models of growth 
(Solow 1956; Swan 1956) in which technological change appeared as an exogenous 
parameter, this New Growth Theory (NGT) has sought to “endogenize” technical 
change by folding its production more fully into the neoclassical positive heuristic.  
Knowledge no longer appears as manna from heaven, but is now produced just as 
are bananas and tires: as the result of the rational optimizing behavior of economic 
agents.1  These agents invest resources in Research and Development (R&D), a 
sausage machine whose output is new technological knowledge.  For reasons that 
Kenneth Arrow (1962) long ago articulated, however, the good called knowledge has 
certain peculiar properties in that, once created, it can spill easily into the hands of 
others at zero marginal cost.2  This process of spillover (and the nonconvexity it 
implies) is the source of the increasing returns that generate economic growth. 
While not questioning some essential truth to this story, students of the 
process of technological change — especially those who have not restricted 
themselves to theoretical models — have expressed considerable doubt about the this 
                                                 
1  It thus strikes me as somewhat incongruous that proponents of the New Growth Theory refer to 
the older Solow-Swan approach as “Neoclassical” Growth Theory, implying that the NGT is 
somehow not neoclassical.  By the accepted criteria of the philosophy of science, it is the other 
way around.  For a more general critique of the NGT see Langlois and Robertson (1996). 
2  To be precise, knowledge is nonrival and (only) partially excludable  (Romer 1990, p. S74). 
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picture of technological knowledge and its creation.  Those who study the historical 
processes of technical change have found that knowledge does not always — and 
perhaps does not usually — take the form Arrow assumed (Nelson 1992).  Much 
technological knowledge cannot in fact be transmitted easily to others; much 
technological knowledge is inarticulate and tacit (Polanyi 1958), and can be 
transmitted only at a cost through imitation and apprenticeship.  This observation 
creates a difficulty for knowledge-based theories of growth.  To the extent that 
knowledge is tacit in this way, it behaves like an ordinary private good, and its role 
in generating increasing returns is lost. 
One response to the problem of tacit knowledge among sophisticated students 
of innovation has been to create a clear distinction between knowledge that is tacit 
and knowledge that is codified.  Codified knowledge is knowledge that has been (or 
can be) converted into symbols for easy transmission, replication, and storage (Boisot 
1995; Saviotti 1998).  Such knowledge thus partakes of Arrovian public-good 
properties, which makes it a potential source of increasing returns.  Under this 
stratagem, the large place of tacit knowledge in social learning does not invalidate 
growth theory so long as there also exists codified knowledge in suitable quantities.  
Some writers would even go further, suggesting that technological change and 
economic growth have had the effect of tipping the balance between tacit and 
codified knowledge (Arora and Gambardella 1994; Cowan and Foray 1997).  “More” 
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knowledge is becoming codified, implying (and perhaps explaining) an accelerated 
pace of social learning and economic growth.   
This essay takes a more skeptical view of the proposition that we are 
experiencing greater codification hand in hand with modern technology and 
economic growth.  But such skepticism need not have dire implications for (the 
theory of) economic growth.  The essay will take an equally skeptical view of the 
proposition that only codified knowledge, and never tacit knowledge, can generate 
economic growth.   
Knowledge as structure. 
Part of the difficulty in understanding the economics of knowledge is that the 
literature is filled with cross-cutting and often mutually inconsistent distinctions and 
definitions:  tacit versus explicit or codified knowledge; general versus localized 
knowledge; abstract versus concrete knowledge — and even the hoary distinction 
between knowledge and information.  This essay may not sort out these tangles, and 
may even make matters worse.  But it is arguably useful to begin with some attention 
to what one means by knowledge. 
Knowledge is a peculiar commodity in ways that go well beyond its 
(sometime) public-good character.  At base, knowledge is always structure.  It is 
therefore an inherently qualitative concept.  Kenneth Boulding put it this way.   
[W]e cannot regard knowledge as simply the accumulation of 
information in a stockpile, even though all messages that are received 
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by the brain may leave some sort of deposit there.  Knowledge must 
itself be regarded as a structure, a very complex and frequently quite 
loose pattern, ... with its parts connected in various ways by ties of 
varying degrees of strength. Messages are continually shot into this 
structure; some of them pass right through its interstices ... without 
effecting any perceptible change in it.  Sometimes messages “stick” to 
the structure and become part of it. ... Occasionally, however, a 
message which is inconsistent with the basic pattern of the mental 
structure, but which is of a nature that it cannot be disbelieved hits the 
structure, which is then forced to undergo a complete reorganization. 
(Boulding 1955, pp. 103-104, quoted in Machlup 1983, p. 643n). 
The association of knowledge with structure is intuitively appealing, if still rather 
vague.  What makes a structure “knowledge”?  At some level, a structure constitutes 
knowledge if that structure is ordered in a way that produces results.  Think of 
genetics.  We can say that DNA is a knowledge structure because it is an orderly 
arrangement that “knows how” to do something, namely how, in conjunction with 
an existing organism, to generate a new organism.  That new organism in turn is also 
an ordered structure that does something, namely survive the evolutionary process.  
Donald MacKay thinks of a system's structure as defining “conditional states 
of readiness” on which a signal operates.  It is the overall configuration that 
determines the meaning — and the meaningfulness — of a message.  “It isn't until 
we consider the range of other states of readiness, that might have been considered but 
weren't, that the notion of meaning comes into its own.  A change in meaning implies 
a different selection from the range of states of readiness.  A meaningless message is 
one that makes no selection from the range.  An ambiguous message is one that 
could make more than one selection” (MacKay, 1969, p. 24, emphasis original).  
  5 
MacKay offers the metaphor of a railroad switching yard in which the configuration 
of tracks and switches stands ready to direct the trains passing through it.  By 
sending the right electronic signal (or, in older yards, by inserting the correct key in a 
switch-box) one can rearrange the configuration of tracks.  The meaningfulness of a 
message thus depends on its form — on the shape of the key.  And that meaning 
consists in the change the message effects in the arrangement of the yard, the 
selection it makes from the set of all possible configurations. 
But where does the structure of knowledge — the railroad switching yard — 
come from?  How does it form, and how is it modified by experience?  As recent 
work in cognitive science is suggesting (Holland et al. 1986; Edelman 1992), human 
learning involves the building up of a structure of categories (of conditional states of 
readiness) from experience.  Through a rule-guided process of sorting, new 
experiences are shunted into appropriate categories, and these experiences may at 
the same time help reinforce or change the structure.  As F. A. Hayek long ago put it, 
“that which we call knowledge is primarily a system of rules of action assisted and 
modified by rules indicating equivalences or differences of various combinations of 
stimuli”3 (Hayek 1978, p. 41).  To study the growth of knowledge is thus to study the 
evolution of systems of rules of action. 
                                                 
3  Hayek’s Sensory Order (1952) arguably anticipated what is the dominant direction of thought 
among cognitive theorists today (Weimer 1982; Edelman 1987).   
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A conceptualization of knowledge as involving rule-following systems is 
certainly consistent with the general understanding of tacit knowledge.  Nelson and 
Winter (1982) have associated Polanyi’s concept with the notion of routines, which 
they see as the basic element of human action.  Routines are habitual patterns of 
behavior that embody skill-like knowledge.4  Such knowledge cannot be articulated 
or transmitted explicitly but must be acquired over time through a process of 
apprenticeship and trial-and-error learning.  A structure of routines — in an 
individual, an organization, or a wider institution — is clearly a system of rules of 
action and a knowledge structure (Langlois 1997). 
But what about codified knowledge?  As Kenneth Arrow (1974, chapter 2) 
notes, individuals and organizations can have a particular kind of knowledge 
structure that is able to understand information consisting of explicit symbols.  In the 
first instance, these symbolic transmissions are information not knowledge.  They are 
codes that activate the rule-based categorization system of the receptor structure in a 
meaningful way.  It is the structure, not the signal, that is knowledge; and, in general, 
the knowledge structure is not itself codified in an important way and may be mostly 
                                                 
4  Cowan and Foray (1997), however, attempt to connect routines to codified knowledge.  In some 
cases, they write, “a procedure that was developed to produce some end becomes routinized, and 
repeatable, which implies that it can be broken down into component pieces, each of which is 
sufficiently simple that it can be described verbally, or embodied in a machine. This, again, is a 
process in which tacit knowledge becomes codified.”  Although repetition and routine may 
certainly lead to embodiment in machines (a point to which I return below), I do not see such 
embodiment as necessarily a process of codification.  Nor is it obvious that repetition and 
replicability by themeselves lead to codification.  A slam dunk is (broadly) repetitive and 
replicable, but no one can write a code that would fairly describe it let alone allow anyone to 
replicate it who had not also engaged in a lengthy process of learning-by-doing. 
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tacit. 5  Even though Chinese characters can be beautifully written in pen and ink, the 
knowledge structure necessary to read the characters has to have been built up by 
years of skill training.   
Some writers, including Cowan and Foray (1997), seem to be making a larger 
claim, namely, that knowledge is increasingly becoming codified.  The sense of the 
term “codified knowledge” must be that some of the structure itself is transformed into 
coded messages, which can then be decoded by others and turned back into 
structure.6  For example, I could transform my tacit knowledge of Chinese (if I had 
any) into the symbols on the page of a textbook, which others could read in order to 
acquire (tacit?) knowledge of the language.  Since much of the mechanism of 
language comprehension and use is inherently ineffable, this kind of translation is 
                                                 
5  Recently, Cowan, David, and Foray (1999) have attacked the too-ready use of the term “tacit 
knowledge” in economics and policy circles, and have attempted to provide a taxonomy of types 
of knowledge.  In their view, knowledge is either already codified or not codified.  Knowledge 
that is not codified — and therefore “tacit” — can be uncodified either because no “codebook” 
has ever been created or because the codebook exists but has been “displaced,” that is, the 
codebook is not explicit but resides in the heads of those who possess the knowledge.  These 
authors also stress, quite rightly, the role of economic incentives in determining how much 
knowledge gets codified.  Although I find this exercise an extremely valuable one, I remain a bit 
troubled by the authors’s (tacit?) assumption that all knowledge is potentially codifiable, at least 
in principle.  In my view, this misses the point of epistemological and phenomenological critics, 
who would insist — in opposition to some scholars of artificial intelligence in computer science 
— that knowledge must always retain an irreducible tacit or contextual component (Dreyfus 
1979).  For Cowan, David, and Foray, tacit knowledge is just knowledge not codified (but 
potentially codifiable).  For these critics, by contrast, all knowledge is both codifiable and 
(inherently) non-codifiable: some parts or aspects of all knowledge can be codified, but some parts 
can never be codified.  It is always possible in principle to create a codebook, but that codebook 
will never capture all the knowledge held by the individuals whose code it is. 
6  There is of course no fine line between transmitting information and transmitting knoweldge, as 
even information may alter the structure into which it is transmitted. In fact, as Machlup points 
out, “[a]ny kind of experience — accidental impressions, observations, and even ‘inner 
experience’ not induced by stimuli received from the environment — may initiate cognitive 
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notoriously imperfect.7  So even if we observe more codified signals in modern 
society, it is problematical to say that we have therefore observed more codified 
knowledge.  And it is even more problematical to assert that we experience nowadays 
a greater proportion of codified to tacit knowledge.8  Ulysses contains far more coded 
symbols than does Where the Wild Things Are; but understanding the former (if that is 
indeed possible) requires a far greater store of tacit knowledge than does 
understanding the latter.   
The allure of codified knowledge stems, I believe, from the perception that 
codification is related to generality and abstractness.  If a bit of information can be 
codified, that means it can be transcribed in some systematic form.  System implies 
generality, perhaps even an understanding of abstract underlying principles.  And 
here is the important point:  knowledge that is general can be applied in many 
different concrete circumstances, thus spreading overheads widely and creating 
increasing returns.   
Arora and Gambardella (1994) make an argument in the same spirit as that of 
Cowan and Foray, but one couched not in terms of codification but directly in terms 
                                                                                                                                                        
processes leading to changes in a person's knowledge.  Thus, new knowledge can be acquired without 
new information being received” (Machlup 1983, p. 644, emphasis original). 
7  Indeed, much of the force of a textbook actually consists not in coded representations of the 
knowledge sought but in injunctions to go forth and acquire tacit skills — through readings, 
problem sets, exercises, listening to tapes of native speakers, etc. 
8  A point that Cowan and Foray acknowledge. 
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of abstractness and generality.9  Technological change, they say, once rested largely 
on localized tacit knowledge gained from trial and error.  Increasingly, however, 
scientists and technologists are able to distill abstract ideas and general principles 
from their experiments, which they can then apply successfully in other concrete 
circumstances.  It is this (increasing) generality and abstractness that, in effect, gives 
rise to the R&D sausage machine of endogenous growth theory.  Because abstract 
knowledge can be applied widely, innovation is no longer tied to trial-and-error 
learning in particular concrete circumstances.  And individuals can increasingly 
specialize in the production of new knowledge, thus finally bringing to reality Adam 
Smith’s prediction that innovation would become the business of “philosophers or 
men of speculation, whose trade it is, not to do any thing, but to observe every thing; 
and who, upon that account, are often capable of combining together the powers of 
the most distant and dissimilar objects”10 (Smith 1976, I.i.9, p. 21). 
Much of this may be true.  In my view, however, the literature praising 
codified, general, and abstract knowledge — and its allegedly increasing importance 
in modern society — misses three crucial and related points.  The first is that 
                                                 
9  “By ‘abstract’ we mean the ability to represent phenomena in terms of a limited number of 
‘essential’ elements, rather than in terms of their ‘concrete’ features.  By ‘general’ we mean 
knowledge that relates the outcome of a particular experiment to the outcomes of other, more 
’distant’ experiments.”  (Arora and Gambardella 1994, p. 524.) 
10  Of course, Smith did not view this as a prediction, but saw it as already characteristic of invention 
in his own day.  And he was right.  As H. I. Dutton (1984, especially pp. 112-117) has shown in 
his study of patening during the Industrial Revolution, invention was already becoming a 
specialized activity in Smith’s day, and the process accelerated throughout the nineteenth 
century.  The same was true of the American Industrial Revolution (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 
1999). 
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generality and abstractness do not require codifiability or explicitness.11  Those of us 
who write about capabilities and routines are often prone to phrases like 
“idiosyncratic and tacit knowledge.”  But tacit knowledge need not in fact be 
idiosyncratic.  Dasgupta and David (1994, p. 494) are right when they say, “we find 
no compelling grounds for associating the tacit knowledge of either technologists or 
scientists necessarily with skills that are specific rather than ‘generic’ in their 
applicability.”  Knowledge of Chinese is surely a tacit skill, but one that reflects 
highly abstract knowledge with very general applicability.  It is also far from 
idiosyncratic, being shared by something like a billion people.   
The second point is that knowledge can be externalized and made less 
idiosyncratic in ways that do not necessarily involve codification.  Knowledge is 
structure.  And knowledge can thus be externalized beyond an individual creator by 
being imbedded either in machines and other physical technology or in various 
kinds of social or behavioral structures that I will broadly call institutions.  These 
latter include imitable routines and skills; organizations; and abstract institutions like 
law, language, or culture.  In discussing the historical sources of American economic 
growth, Gavin Wright (1999, p. 296) notes that technological knowledge “is not 
simply a body of abstract information, but is inherently social, embedded in 
                                                 
11  Compare Cowan and Foray (1997): “Typically, a piece of knowledge initially appears as purely 
tacit—a person has an idea. Often, though, as the new knowledge ages, it goes through a process 
whereby it becomes more codified.  As  it is explored, used, and better understood, less of it 
remains idiosyncratic to a person or few people, and more of it is transformed into some 
systematic form that can be communicated at low costs.” 
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terminology, in procedures, in physical equipment and in products.”  The 
nonconvexities that gave rise to growth in the United States arose from the 
increasingly national character of the “learning networks” that lay behind 
technological change.  In effect, increased economic integration and labor mobility 
tended to standardize and generalize the country’s knowledge-bearing institutions, 
permitting the knowledge they contained to be more widely reused and to be spread 
over more concrete applications.  (I return to this theme below.)  
The third point is that social institutions are often valuable precisely because 
and to the extent that they obviate the codification of knowledge.  As Alfred North 
Whitehead remarked, it is “a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all copy-
books and by eminent people when they are making speeches, that we should 
cultivate the habit of thinking what we are doing.  The precise opposite is the case.  
Civilization advances by extending the number of important operations which we 
can perform without thinking about them”12 (Whitehead 1911, p. 61).  Or, we might 
add, without describing them explicitly.  To the extent that institutions embody 
knowledge, they make it less necessary for us to transmit information or acquire 
knowledge, codified or otherwise.  Basketball players can execute such highly 
complex maneuvers as a fast break with only a minimal set of non-verbal signals.  
Similarly, professionals working in the same area of technology can often 
                                                 
12  As Whitehead adds:  “Operations of thought are like cavalry charges in a battle -- they are strictly 
limited in number, they require fresh horses, andmust only be made at decisive moments.” I am 
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communicate insights and ideas with only minimal sets of signals.  Well-functioning 
teams and organizations can operate effectively with no communication at all.  
Indeed, in such cases to observe a large amount of codified transmission would be 
evidence of less-effective knowledge structures — not evidence of “more” 
knowledge.13 
The reuse of knowledge. 
An important part of my argument here is that, because knowledge — even, or 
maybe especially, tacit knowledge — can be imbedded in institutions, we need to 
look to institutions for the sources of the nonconvexities that give rise to increasing 
returns and economic growth.  That institutions partake of increasing returns is 
certainly well known (North 1990, p. 95).  But what is the source of those increasing 
returns?14  I have argued elsewhere (Langlois 1999b) that increasing returns can in 
most cases be understood as instances of the reuse of knowledge. 
                                                                                                                                                        
indebted to both Brian Loasby and Bhaven Sampat for directing me to the original source of this 
quotation. 
13  Cowan and Foray (1997) are right in pointing out that “it is in the context of change that we 
might find situations of excess codification.”  When the environment is changing, knowledge 
structures (whether tacit or codifying) are becoming less well adapted, leading to the generation 
and transmission of more codified information during the process of readaptation.  This 
phenomenon is related to the “dynamic transaction costs” that can afflict organization in a world 
of rapid change (Langlois and Robertson 1995). 
14  North (1990, pp. 94-95) cites four reasons that Brian Arthur (1988) had articulated in the context 
of technology: large set-up or fixed costs; learning effects; coordination effects; and adaptive 
expectations.  The last three of these have obviously to do with knowledge.  I argue below that 
even the notion of amortizing fixed set-up costs can be understood in terms of the reuse of 
knowledge. 
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There are two mechanisms by which the reuse of knowledge can generate 
increasing returns, and both are driven by the extent of the market.  The first is better 
appreciated: Smith’s division-of-labor effect.  The second is distinct and less often 
noticed; it is related to what I have called the “volume effect” (Langlois 1999a).  
In the Smithian story, labor starts out unspecialized, in that each worker 
performs many different task; but each of the many tools the worker uses is 
specialized to a particular task.  The division of labor consists in specializing labor to 
the same level as the already-specialized tools.  This does not exhaust the 
possibilities, however.  It is also possible, through mechanical innovation, for tools to 
become less specialized — to integrate previously separate tasks as the extent of the 
market grows (Ames and Rosenberg 1965; Robertson and Alston 1992).  Transferring 
these tasks to machine embeds in the machine the knowledge of how to perform the 
tasks. 
In drilling the plate A without the jig the skilled mechanic must expend 
thought as well as skill in properly locating the holes.  The unskilled 
operator need expend no thought regarding the location of the holes.  
That part of the mental labor has been done once for all by the tool 
maker.  It appears, therefore, that a “transfer of thought” or intelligence 
can also be made from a person to a machine.  If the quantity of parts to 
be made is sufficiently large to justify the expenditure, it is possible to 
make machines to which all the required skill and thought have been 
transferred and the machine does not require even an attendant, except 
to make adjustments.  Such machines are known as full automatic 
machines. (Kimball 1929, p. 26, emphasis original.) 
As this quote from an old text on the organization of industry suggests, the transfer 
to a machine of “intelligence” archetypically takes the form of a jig, pattern, or die.  
  14 
And, as Alchian (1959) points out, the “method of production is a function of the 
volume of output, especially when output is produced from basic dies — and there are 
few, if any, methods of production that do not involve ‘dies’” (Alchian 1959 [1977, p 282], 
emphasis added).  Why?  Because, with increased volume, it pays to invest in more 
durable dies.   
Consider the example of printing.  If one is going to run off a few copies of a 
memo, a photocopy machine will do the trick.  If one needs several hundred copies 
of documents on an ongoing basis, it might be worth investing in a small offset press.  
For even larger predictable production runs, it would pay to have a more serious 
printing press.  As volume and predictability allow greater “durability of dies,” unit 
costs decline.  This is an effect of growth in the extent of the market distinct from the 
division of labor narrowly understood.  And the reason that costs decline as dies 
become more durable is not because the knowledge itself leaks out but because the 
knowledge— created once — is spread over more and more units.   
The first mechanism of knowledge reuse — the Smithian division of labor — 
also operates by imbedding knowledge rather than by transmitting it.  But in this 
case the knowledge is imbedded in organizations and institutions rather than in 
technology.  Smith’s own account of the division of labor is very much about how 
(re)organization can yield increasing returns — about how knowledge can be 
imbedded in an organizational structure and, through standardization, can both 
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substitute for and amplify the knowledge the individual workers possess 
(Leijonhufvud 1986; Langlois 1999a).  
Notice that, in the case of organizations and institutions as in the case of 
technology, standardization is arguably the fundamental source of increasing 
returns.  Here, however, it is behavior rather than physical technology that is 
standardized.  Whether it is a classical Weberian bureaucracy (Mintzberg 1979) or an 
association as diffuse as a profession (Savage and Robertson 1999; Langlois and 
Savage 2000), the organization achieves coordination by standardizing the repertoire 
of routines its members possess.  This is just as clearly true in the case of institutions, 
which, in a fundamental sense, are standards that orient behavior15 (North 1990).  To 
take a simple example, the rule that one always drive on the right in the United 
States is an institution that allows us to coordinate our behavior with that of others 
by forcing us to reuse the same piece of knowledge over and over.   
Perhaps the case of software will illustrate these points.  In terms of embedded 
technology, software is the paradigm case of knowledge reuse through durable dies.  
Once written, a piece of code can be stamped out an indefinite number of times at 
little more than the marginal cost of burning a CD (Shapiro and Varian 1998).  The 
idea of knowledge reuse, however, is generally associated with a somewhat different 
aspect of software production.  Michael Cusumano (1991) argued that vertically 
                                                 
15  I am implicitly following North’s (1990) distinction between institutions as the abstract rules of 
the game versus organizations as collective actors operating within the rules.  In fact, however, 
the distinction is far more complex and blurry (Langlois 1995). 
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integrated Japanese software houses may have advantages over decentralized 
American ones because the Japanese firms are better able to reuse portions of code 
written for earlier applications.  Unlike American firms, Japanese firms can 
“remember” and don’t have to start each new application from scratch.  Notice that 
the increasing returns here arise in the context of economies of scope rather than of 
scale.16  Notice also, however, that the economies arise (a) from standardization and 
(b) within the context of organization.  The function of memory is embedded in the 
Japanese firms in a way that it is (supposedly) not embedded in the American ones.   
It turns out, however, that the “software factory” approach does not seem to 
have given Japanese firms anything like an advantage against American software 
developers.  Rather the opposite is the case.  The reason is that American firms have 
benefited from two other, more powerful, forms of standardization: standardized 
hardware platforms and object-oriented programming17 (Mowery 1995, p. 310). By 
reducing variety, the former reduced any economies-of-scope benefits the factory 
approach may have conveyed.  And, by creating public standards, object-orientation 
pushed the reuse of knowledge from the organizational to the institutional realm, 
effectively creating external economies of scope (Langlois and Robertson 1995, p. 5).   
                                                 
16  Depending, of course, upon how narrowly one defines the product.  Reuse of code gives 
economies of scope if it reduces the costs of producing different applications, but it gives 
economies of scale in the production of “more software.” 
17  Object-oriented programming involves a highly standardized and modularized form of code-
writing that allows programmers to assemble code easily from preexisting pieces much as a child 
assembles a structure out of building blocks. 
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Standardization and variety. 
Let me recast the argument a different way.  Generality — the wide applicability and 
reusability of knowledge — is a source of increasing returns.  But the limits to 
generality do not come from the tacitness of knowledge, since tacit knowledge can in 
fact be general.  Moreover, all knowledge can be embedded in technology and 
institutions, and thus can be reused without being replicated qua knowledge through 
the Arrovian mechanism.  What limits generality thus comes less from the supply 
side than from the demand side.  That is, it is the demand for variety that, by limiting 
the possibilities for standardization, limits the reuse of knowledge.  Bresnahan and 
Gambardella put it nicely. 
An inherent tension in any division of labor is that the distinct users of 
a technology, or for that matter of a good or service, employ it for 
different purposes.  Consequently, they have different needs, and these 
needs would be best satisfied by producing, adapting, or using the 
technology or input according to their special goals and demands. This 
is a force for localization. Standardizing the technology or input allows 
exploitation of the gains from specialization, while localizing it permits 
superior matching. A general specialty is a compromise between the 
scale economies inherent in specialization and the failure to localize 
inherent in generality18 (Bresnahan and Gambardella 1998). 
The tradeoff is clear in the paradigm case of the reuse of knowledge through more 
durable dies.  In order to spread the knowledge contained in the dies over more and 
more units, enough people must be willing to consume the identical products 
stamped out.  As Henry Ford insisted, you can have any color Model T you want as 
                                                 
18  I discuss below what the authors mean by a “general specialty.” 
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long as it’s black.  Indeed, Alfred Marshall was one of the first of many to attribute 
American economic growth in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to “the 
homogeneity of the American demand for manufactured goods,” which enabled 
standardization and mass production (Marshall 1920, I.viii.3, p. 146-7).   
It is also possible, of course, to permit some variety while still reusing 
knowledge if the knowledge is applicable to more than one variant.  In Cusumano’s 
software-factory example, portions of code are reused in similar but not identical 
applications.  General Motors pioneered an analogous strategy in the early 
automobile industry, using durable dies to stamp out standardized parts that went 
into a wide variety of slightly differentiated variant models (Raff 1991) — a classic 
American idea that Marshall (1920, I.viii.2, p. 141) called “multiform” 
standardization.  This kind of “flexible specialization” need not be limited to physical 
technology.  In the early part of this century, the American medical profession 
responded to the size and integration of the American market by standardizing 
medical training and medical record-keeping in a way that equipped individual 
practitioners with a standardized “toolkit” of routines but allowed them the 
flexibility to apply those routines to widely varying concrete circumstances (Langlois 
and Savage 2000). 
Using the terminology of George Stigler (1951), Bresnahan and Gambardella 
(1998) have called attention to the role in economic growth of “general specialties,” 
also called general-purpose technologies.  A general specialty is a stage of production 
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(specialized labor or tools) possessing knowledge or capabilities that are applicable 
to the production of many different outputs.  Sometimes this is literally a technology, 
as in the case of the microprocessor, which, through software, can be adapted to 
many different uses.  But the idea also presumably applies to knowledge more 
broadly, as in the case of American machine-tool capabilities in the early nineteenth 
century, which found application in a wide variety of mechanical industries 
(Rosenberg 1976, p. 16). 
Very clearly, institutions can serve the same economies-of-scope function; they 
are also general-purpose technologies in this sense.  The more abstract the institution, 
the more general its applicability, and the more widely can the knowledge it contains 
be reused and spread across different and varied outputs.  As Hayek (1973, p. 50) has 
said, abstract institutions consist of “rules applicable to an unknown and 
indeterminable number of persons and instances.”  Examples surely include 
language, law, social conventions, and even culture more broadly.  All involve pieces 
of knowledge shared across many individuals and uses.  All are, in effect, standards.   
The key difference between knowledge embodied in (standardizing) 
institutions and knowledge embodied in replicated artifacts is that the former allows 
greater variety in the ways the knowledge is reused.  This is so because the standard 
creates a framework in which variety can in effect be created by the consumer. To see 
the point, consider the provision of variety in system products, complicated goods or 
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services consisting of many interacting components and subsystems.  For many such 
goods, variety can come in the form of multiple preassembled packages.   
For instance, there are significant economies of scale in the assembly of cars; 
but, relative to the size of the market, those economies are exhausted early enough 
that many different firms can profitably offer consumers many different models, each 
a distinct system product.  In this example, the benefits of standardization come 
entirely from the economies of scale in production they enable.  But, in other cases, 
standardization can have additional benefits that come not from the supply side but 
from the demand side.  These benefits arise from the much-discussed phenomenon 
of network effects: the benefits to any individual of a would-be standard depend on 
how many other individuals already adhere (or are likely to adhere) to that 
alternative.19  As more and more users commit to a standard, that standard becomes 
increasingly attractive to others; the commitment of those others makes the standard 
even more attractive — and so on in a cumulative fashion that is often described as 
“positive feedback.”  These are called network effects because, in the first instance, 
they arise in the case of physical connection networks like telephone systems.  The 
value to me of a phone system increases with the number of other people who are on 
the system.  But the concept has been applied to “virtual networks” in which the 
connections are not physical but rather in the nature of economic complementarity 
(Katz and Shapiro 1985).  For example, the benefit to consumers of a new digital 
                                                 
19  For recent surveys, see David and Greenstein (1990) and Economides (1996). 
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television standard is proportional to the amount of programming they expect to be 
available on that standards, which is in turn dependent of the number of people who 
adopt the standard.  
The dominance of a single standard may have its costs in foregone variety.  
Imagine a world in which manufacturers were all required to produce identical 
generic “people’s cars” the parts for which were all standardized and 
interchangeable.  Although there would likely be intense competition within the 
system by parts suppliers and assemblers, probably leading to significant modular 
innovation (Langlois and Robertson 1992), the benefits of the standard would likely 
be outweighed by the costs in lost variety.  Of course, saying that parts are 
interchangeable doesn’t mean that they are all identical, and cars could be 
differentiated by the parts they use rather than by the overall design.  To take a 
trivial example, one could plug in a high-quality car stereo system as easily as a low-
quality one.  But, in the case of automobiles, the fact of economies of scale in 
assembly and the lack of demand-side network effects suggest that variety is 
probably best provided in preset packages. 
In many other systems, however, this is not the case.  When there are low 
economies of scale in assembling a system, a modular structure, in which variety is 
provided through the choice of modules, can more thoroughly blanket the product 
space, and can do so in virtually a perfectly discriminating way (Langlois and 
Robertson 1992).  This point applies a fortiori to so-called hardware-software 
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networks in which the “modules” are in the nature of software.  Indeed, as a rough 
approximation, we might say that there is less of a tradeoff between variety and 
standardization the greater the extent to which variety is a matter of “software” 
rather than “hardware.”   
In part, this is a reflection of our perspective within the hierarchy of systems.  
Even if there are economies of scale in assembling major components of the system, 
there may not be economies of scale in offering variety in the system as a whole.  For 
example, there are economies of scale in assembling televisions and videocassette 
recorders.  But there are no such economies to hooking those components together 
and playing one of a wide variety of available tapes.  Similarly, there are economies 
of scale in packaging variety in cars, but lower economies in packaging variety in the 
wider transportation system, since travel to different destinations using 
complementary modular assets like roads is a source of variety.  Notice that, in both 
cases, it is the software rather than hardware — the tapes in one case and the 
destinations in the other — that creates much of the variety in the larger system.  Of 
course, cars and (perhaps a lesser extent) video hardware nonetheless continue to 
provide some element of the variety, since different hardware can interact with the 
software to produce slightly different experiences.  Driving through the Berkshires in 
a Porsche is not the same as driving there in a Chevy; watching Star Wars on a wide-
screen TV is not the same as watching it on a 19-inch screen.  In the case of personal 
computers, however, even the hardware can be varied by recombining modules. 
  23 
These observations generalize from technological standards to standards qua 
institutions more generally.  Although there would surely be a loss of variety in some 
sense if we were all to speak only one language, yet that one language would be 
capable of generating an infinite variety of “software.”  I can enjoy just as many 
destinations if I have to drive on the left and if green means stop.  And inhabitants of 
the same “learning network” –- to recall Wright’s term — can generate a limitless 
variety of innovations. 
Consumption. 
The “demand side” has entered our story so far only in a rather negative way.  By 
craving variety, consumers reduce the ability of producers to standardize products 
and thus to spread knowledge overheads through embodiment in output.  Two 
remarks are in order, however.  First, consumers of intermediate goods (who are 
themselves producers and not final consumers) can also crave variety to the extent 
that similar outputs are produced in different ways in different places.  Second, 
modern consumption theory sees even final consumers as producers who cobble 
together basic utility from various inputs (Lancaster 1971, Stigler and Becker 1977).  
Thus much of what I argued above applies easily to final consumption as well, even 
if there remain a few twists and turns. 
Metin Cosgel and I have suggested that, although we should readily embrace 
the simile of consumption as production, we ought, however, to change our picture 
of how consumption is produced (Langlois and Cosgel 1998).  Rather than taking on 
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board the conventional production-function approach, we should apply instead the 
theory of economic capabilities that is gaining currency in the theory of the firm 
(Teece and Pisano 1994; Langlois and Robertson 1995).  In this view, the 
“production” knowledge required for consumption is not explicit and given, not 
contained in the mythical blueprints of neoclassical price theory.  Instead, such 
knowledge is a matter of consumption routines, often tacit and acquired at a cost.  As 
in the theory of the firm, one of the central issues in this revised theory of 
consumption is one of boundaries, that is, what kinds of routines will be generated 
within the consumption unit (the household) and what kinds imported from 
without?  In light of our concerns here, we can recast the question thus:  what are the 
possibilities for knowledge reuse in the household, and what are their implications 
for economic growth? 
The problem of knowledge on the consumption side is not entirely a new 
concern.  Four score and seven years ago, Wesley Clair Mitchell pondered the 
problems of knowledge and organization in consumption.  “Important as the art of 
spending money is,” he wrote, “we have developed less skill in its practice than in 
the practice of making money” (Mitchell 1912, p. 269).  It may shed considerable light 
on our themes to examine with hindsight Mitchell’s analysis of the problem of 
consumption and his predictions for how economic growth would interact with that 
problem. 
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The wellspring of Mitchell’s analysis is the observation that final consumption 
is necessarily crafts production.  Because the final consumer must buy or produce 
internally a wide variety of items and services in small batches, its is never cost 
effective to use either high-volume machinery or the division of labor to any 
significant extent.  If shopping “could be taken over for many families and conducted 
by a business enterprise it would be subdivided into several departments, and each 
department would have its own minute division of labor” (p. 272).  But this is not 
possible within a single household.  Mitchell is similarly pessimistic about the use of 
large-scale machinery.  “The family unit is so small, the tasks are so various, and the 
housework is so scattered from cellar to attic as to make machinery more 
troublesome than useful. … Hence the equipment which can be employed 
economically in the household falls into the class of inexpensive utensils and hand 
tools; even in this age of steam and electricity, a family must be cared for by hand” 
(p. 272).   
Two other problems plague household consumption in Mitchell’s account.  
The first is that, unlike a business, a household cannot avail itself of the latest in 
scientific (codified?) knowledge.  This is not merely because of the crafts character of 
household production but because consumption (or family management, at any rate) 
relies more on sciences like psychology and physiology, which (in Mitchell’s’ view) 
are backward in comparison with the physical and chemical sciences of use to 
industry.  “Until such time as science shall illuminate the housewife’s path, she must 
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walk in the twilight of traditional opinion” (p. 276).  The second impediment to 
household production is that, unlike a business, a household cannot use money as a 
common denominator to allocate resources internally.  The benefits of the price 
system — a crucial knowledge-economizing institution — are limited to the 
household’s interactions with the market. 
What are Mitchell’s’ prescriptions to solve the dilemmas of consumption?  On 
the whole he is pessimistic, as he (rightly) sees the desire for privacy and the 
durability of the nuclear family as militating against a non-crafts form of household 
production.  But he does see two possible areas of productivity improvement:  (1) 
communal consumption in order to share overheads and divide labor and (2) 
improving the capabilities of consumers through the progress and dissemination of 
science and through increased education of consumers.  
Among the examples of communal consumption Mitchell has in mind are 
apartment buildings, “with their steam heat, janitor services, and common 
washtubs” (p. 280), as well as something called the family hotel, which was 
presumably a kind of boarding house that catered to families.  He also cites various 
kinds of public facilities like “playgrounds, parks, library stations, day-nurseries — a 
socialized spending of money with a neighborhood instead of a family as unit” (p. 
280).  It is interesting that Mitchell never seems to think of the market as a source of 
communal consumption.  
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Mitchell is more sanguine about the beneficial effects of new knowledge 
directly imbibed by households.  “With greater confidence we may rely upon 
progress in physiology and psychology to make wider and more secure the scientific 
foundations of housekeeping” (p. 280).  This knowledge, he feels, will be readily 
disseminated by popular magazines and women’s clubs.  “Probably of more 
importance will be the growing attention to ‘domestic science’ in the schools, and the 
efforts of colleges and universities to meet the popular demand for adequate 
instruction in the matters of gravest import to future wives and mothers” (p. 280).  
He even suggests the possible emergence of a profession of Doctors of Domestic 
Science, who would serve a function somewhere between consultancy and social 
work.   
In its analysis of the problem of consumption, Mitchell’s essay holds up well.  
Consumption remains very much crafts production.  Indeed, with the passing of the 
traditional female role, there is arguably less division of labor in the household today 
than there was in Mitchell’s time.  And, although we now have innumerable gadgets 
Mitchell could never have imagined — from food processors and microwaves to 
vacuum cleaners and clothes dryers — these innovations are improvements in the 
tools of a craft, not integrated large-scale machines employing durable dies.   
In his prognostications, Mitchell has perhaps fared less well.  Far from 
witnessing increased communal consumption, the last 87 years have seen a secular 
decline in it.  Privacy is a normal good, and, with rising incomes, people have craved 
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more.  This, along with the automobile, abundant land, and favorable government 
policies in the United States, has led to the widespread ownership of single-family 
homes — all despite the prospect of common washtubs.  And, much to the dismay of 
innumerable social commentators over the years, technological changes have also 
made other consumption activities more private.20  Television comes to mind.   
In a crucial sense, however, present-day consumers do rely on more 
“collective” consumption that did their forebears in Mitchell’s day.  But the shared 
overheads from which they benefit come to them through the market, in many ways 
the most “collective” of all social institutions.  Mitchell understood this phenomenon 
early in his essay, when he notes that people in more primitive times and on the 
frontier needed to make for themselves products we can now rely on others for.  But 
Mitchell writes as if this margin disappeared once people stopped spinning their 
own wool and building their own furniture.  In fact, the margin is alive and well.  
When we take the kids to daycare, order Chinese, or call in a cleaning company or a 
caterer, we are outsourcing in much the same way an industrial concern might 
outsource.21  And we do it for the same reasons.   
There is also another mechanism through which we benefit as consumers from 
the increasing returns available in the market.  Just as the factory system took 
                                                 
20  Even when people today consume collectively — as when they attend rock concerts or sporting 
events — they do not do so to share overheads or reduce costs.  Quite the opposite. The collective 
character of such consumption is simply another (sometimes) valuable characteristic of the good, 
which could otherwise have been provided more cheaply in a private fashion. 
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advantage of unskilled labor by embodying knowledge in organizational structure, 
so too producers (and sometimes consumers themselves) can compensate for the lack 
of consumer capabilities by embodying knowledge in products and services and in 
consumption institutions.  The TV dinners and redimix cakes of the 50s have long 
since attained the status of cultural icons.  With prepackaged and tested medicines, 
consumers today can attain better health outcomes than Mitchell’s contemporaries 
with arguably a smaller stock of knowledge about physiology.  Chain stores and 
large-scale markets reduce search costs by allowing customers to reuse their 
knowledge about where to find things.22  Indeed, we can think of large-scale outlets 
like Walmart as modular consumption systems that allow buyers to assemble variety 
at low cost.   
Thus, far from having gained greater training in the domestic arts, consumers-
as-producers have become “deskilled” by knowledge embodied in products and 
institutions.  Given also the high opportunity cost of any specialization in 
“homemaking” in an advanced economy, it is not surprising that the market for 
instruction in domestic skills has tanked.  What was once Home Economics at my 
university is now the Department of Design and Resource Management, and it caters 
more to varsity athletes seeking acceptable grades than to prospective homemakers.   
                                                                                                                                                        
21  In the United States, daycare is typically provided through the market rather than through the 
communal day-nurseries Mitchell envisaged. 
22  Of course, to the extent that shopping conveys utility directly, consumers may prefer more 
“artisinal” shopping, which explains the popularity of boutiques.   
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This does not mean, however, that there is no role for learning by consumers 
themselves.  There are still arguably “learning networks” in consumption, even if 
they no longer manifest themselves through women’s clubs.  People with similar 
inclinations — whether it be child rearing, computers, or skiing — gather together in 
informal networks to share information and experiences.  Moreover, if we take the 
view that consumption knowledge is a matter of learned routines, then other 
institutions of consumer learning appear in unexpected places.  Mitchell mentions 
the phenomenon of conspicuous consumption popularized by his contemporary 
Veblen, apparently viewing such behavior as an inefficient manifestation of the 
difficulty of allocating resources in the absence of a rational common denominator 
like money.  But if consumption knowledge is costly and embedded in routines, we 
might actually wonder whether keeping up with the Joneses, and maybe even 
aspects of conspicuous consumption itself, may not reflect the rational imitation of 
successful consumption routines observed in others.  Following fashion can have the 
effect of standardizing consumption routines, even if rapid changes in fashion have 
the opposite effect. 
The issue of change returns us to the topic of knowledge as structure.  The 
assembled routines of consumers are a knowledge structure that, to be effective, 
must be compatible with other knowledge structures in society.  In this case, the 
routines of consumers must mesh with those of producers (Langlois and Cosgel 
1998).  In the long run this is not much of a problem, as each side has the incentive to 
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adapt to the other.  In the short run, however, major technological changes in the 
routines of consumption or (perhaps more typically) of production may necessitate 
major changes on the other side.  Sometimes these changes are far from traumatic.  
Consumers arguably adapted easily to the introduction of branded packaged goods 
in the nineteenth century, even though these eliminated the role of intermediaries 
(like the butcher or the keeper of the general store) in measuring quantity and 
assuring quality (Chandler 1977).  But the change from mainframe computers to the 
decentralized client-server technology in the 1990s required a much more dramatic 
change in the routines of users, one that Bresnahan and Greenstein (1997) go so far as 
to label “coinvention.” 
Growth. 
At the American Economic Association meeting three years ago, Paul Romer 
described the worldview of the New Growth Theory this way.   
New growth theorists now start by dividing the world into two 
fundamentally different types of productive inputs that can be called 
“ideas” and “things.”  Ideas are nonrival goods that could be stored in 
a bit string.  Things are rival goods with mass (or energy).  With ideas 
and things, one can explain how economic growth works.  Nonrival 
ideas can be used to rearrange things, for example, when one follows a 
recipe and transforms noxious olives into tasty and healthful olive oil.  
Economic growth arises from the discovery of new recipes and the 
transformation of things from low to high value configurations (Romer 
1996, p. 204).   
I have tried here to take the contrary position that (1) this distinction is not true to the 
world and (2) it is not necessary to explain economic growth.   
  32 
Knowledge often lives in things themselves, and just as often in the interstices 
between things and bit strings.  These interstices are institutions.  Growth is indeed 
about increasing returns, about the nonconvexities that arise when knowledge is 
produced once then reused many times.  But the mechanism of knowledge reuse 
does not always — and perhaps does not mostly — involve knowledge transmission.  
Instead, the knowledge is reused by being imbedded in technology, organizations, 
and institutions.  Although private rent-seeking behavior surely drives the engine, 
the process of knowledge creation is a social one, a kind of spontaneous order that 
arises not mostly from the directed search for knowledge but from the unintended 
effects of production and consumption.  Knowledge creation is unmistakably 
endogenous to the economic process.  But if we try to overlay a production function 
on this process, it would have to look more like the manna of an exogenous λ 
parameter than the result of rational optimizing behavior aimed at its creation.  This 
is far from saying that we can’t theorize about the process of knowledge creation and 
its role in economic growth.  We have a lot of pieces of that theory.  But they are not 
lying under the production-function lamppost. 
“If new growth theorists have their way,” writes Romer (1996, p. 206), “the 
first distinction economists will draw when looking at the physical world will be the 
one that separates rival things from nonrival ideas.”  If I have my way — admittedly, 
a far less likely possibility — economists will realize that things and ideas cannot be 
separated.
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